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ὁμοίους ἡμῖν: PROVOCATIVE CONTRADICTIONS IN PLATO’S MYTH OF ER 
 
 
“’You speak of a strange image,’ he said, ‘and strange prisoners.’ ‘They’re just 
like us,’ I said.”1 (Rep. 7.515a) 
 
 
One of the most striking aspects of Plato’s dialogues is their sense of familiarity. 
His colloquial ease has been famous since antiquity. Quintilian praises the “divine 
ease” of Plato’s prose (eloquendi facultate divina quadam, Inst. 10.1.81); even the 
sentence that the biographical tradition latched onto to demonstrate Plato’s 
fastidiousness (φιλοπονίας)2 as a writer is, as Harvey Yunis (2007: 14) describes, 
“utterly innocent, shockingly offhand.” Not only is the style familiar, the world and the 
characters that constitute it are too. Many of the dialogues are narrated as if told to 
an intimate and presuppose familiarity with interlocutors and with other dialogues. 
But it is one of Plato’s greatest ironies that through stylistic familiarity he aims at 
epistemic defamiliarisation. This disorientation, this questioning of cultural norms is, 
after all, the central project of the Socratic method (Apol. 23b)3 and the system of 
education outlined in the Republic (414d).4 Socrates unsettles his interlocutors by 
deconstructing and defamiliarizing their deepest convictions. So too, the Noble 
Falsehood, the mythic cornerstone of the kallipolis, creates a “reflective 
disequilibrium,” as Jonathan Lear (2006: 32) puts it, that “is meant to instill discontent 
with one’s entire epistemic condition.” Plato’s subtlety as a writer is such that the 
                                                
1 All translations are my own unless otherwise noted. 
2 That is, the first sentence of the Republic. Dionysius of Halicarnassus tells us that “Plato did 
not cease, when he was eighty years old, to comb and curl his dialogues and reshape them in 
every way. Surely every scholar is acquainted with the stories of Plato’s passion for taking 
pains (φιλοπονίας), especially that of the tablet which they say was found after his death, with 
the beginning of the Republic (‘I went down yesterday to the Piraeus with Glaucon son of 
Ariston’) arranged in elaborately varying orders” (De Compositione Verborum 25, trans. 
Roberts). 
3 ταῦτ᾽ οὖν ἐγὼ µὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιιὼν ζητῶ καὶ ἐρευνῶ κατὰ τὸν θεὸν καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ 
ξένων ἄν τινα οἴωµαι σοφὸν εἶναι: καὶ ἐπειδάν µοι µὴ δοκῇ, τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν ἐνδείκνυµαι ὅτι 
οὐκ ἔστι σοφός. 
4 See Lear (2006: 25-43). 
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most unsettling moments – these moments of defamiliarisation – are unsettling 
precisely because of their familiarity. 
My focus here is the sense of the familiar in the myth of Er in Republic X. I argue 
that this myth, like Plato’s other eschatological myths, is contaminated with a sense 
of the familiar, and that it is the pervasive sense of this-worldliness that unsettles us 
as readers. While purporting to provide an account of ineffable blessedness in the 
afterlife, the myth instead presents an image of disembodied existence that cannot 
but remind us of our own very corporeal life on Earth. Through mise en abyme the 
myth holds up a mirror to the reader, and dramatises the experience of reading a text 
like the Republic. The effect is to point us to the dialogue’s relevance to the here-
and-now and to remind us of our role as readers. 
The interpretative challenges of the myth of Er are well known.5 Stephen Halliwell 
(2007: 450-457) has demonstrated the difficulty of deriving an irreducible meaning 
from a myth that is “deliberately puzzling” and seeks to “thwart transparent exegesis.” 
He points out how the myth contradicts arguments about mimesis made earlier in the 
Republic, how the presentation of the afterlife in the myth of Er is inconsistent with an 
understanding of the afterlife that was up to this point vague at best, and how the 
myth paradoxically describes disembodied souls that nevertheless have hands, feet, 
names, and identities. While Halliwell focuses on the general indeterminacy of the 
myth, I would emphasise that the myth is so “astonishingly bizarre,” as he puts it, in 
part because it is so very familiar; it is a depiction of another world that reminds us of 
our own. 
                                                
5 In addition to Halliwell 2007 (outlined below), see Annas (1982: 119-143) and Inwood (2009: 
28-50) for a survey of the difficulties presented by Plato’s eschatological myths in general and 
with the myth of Er in particular. 
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The frame of the myth sets our sights on the sublime.6 In the introduction to the 
story, Socrates announces that the rewards that come to the just man during life are 
“nothing in multitude or size in comparison with those that await him upon his death” 
(614a). The myth of Er, then, is framed as a story about the rewards of the just in the 
afterlife. What we get instead is a far more earthly account of the corporal 
punishment of souls after death.7 Though we have been led to expect an image of 
disembodied blessedness for the just and a description of retribution of the unjust 
that does not simply “bury them in mud” (εἰς πηλόν τινα κατορύττουσιν ἐν Ἅιδου, 
363d), as traditional underworld mythology tends to do, the ‘marvelous place’ (τόπον 
δαιµόνιον 614d) that Er describes is strikingly this-worldly. The topography is 
described spatially and physically. Though apparently disembodied, judges sit 
(καθῆσθαι, 614c) in clearly defined spaces and attach onto the souls signs (σηµεῖα, 
614c), inscribed with their deeds during life, to the front of the just souls (ἐν τῷ 
πρόσθεν) and to the back (ἐν τῷ ὄπισθεν) of the unjust. They even get dusty and 
dirty (ἐκ τῆς γῆς μεστὰς αὐχμοῦ τε καὶ κόνεως) as they rise from an underground 
chasm that cannot but resemble the traditional pit of mud Adeimantus ridiculed in 
Book II. Halliwell sums up the paradox: 
Er’s soul continues to behave entirely like an incarnate person, listening to 
and watching everything that confronts it. So, rather vividly, do all the souls in 
the myth: […] they enter and leave the place of judgment, wear their verdicts 
round their necks, convene in encampments like festival crowds, and make 
use of language. Prima facie, then, the souls possess bodies: Ardiaeus and 
the other tyrants even have their hands, feet, and heads shackled before 
being flayed (615e-616a). (Halliwell 2007: 461) 
 
                                                
6 See Ferrari (2009: 126-129) for a discussion of the myth’s omissions and misdirections. 
7 Ferrari (2009: 126) explains: “Of all Plato’s eschatological myths, the myth of Er is the most 
rooted in the problems of mortal life. Socrates’ story deals hardly at all with the rewards of 
justice in the afterlife.” 
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The language of the myth is deliberately paradoxical; for it is in fact necessary for our 
visualisation of the scene that we violate logic and imagine these so-called 
disembodied souls as fully incarnate people. 
The souls that inhabit Er’s afterlife are not only endowed with human bodies, they 
also exhibit a strikingly familiar psychology to our own. They experience fear (φόβων, 
616a), happiness (ἀσμενέστατα), suffering (πεπονθότες, 615d), regret (κόπτεσθαί τε 
καὶ ὀδύρεσθαι, 619c), gluttony (λαιμαργίας, 619b), and hatred (μίσει, ἔχθρᾳ, 620a-b). 
They are endowed with memories (μνήμῃ, 620c) and gender, and they have 
coherent identities.8 They even engage in small talk. While the content of their 
conversations concerns the soul’s ultimate destiny, Er’s report of it emphasizes its 
relative banality: 
And [he said that] the souls, coming one after another, appeared to have 
come from a long journey (ὥσπερ ἐκ πολλῆς πορείας), and came happily to 
the meadow to camp, as if at a festival, and those who were friends 
embraced each other (ἀσπάζεσθαί τε ἀλλήλας) and the souls that came from 
the earth asked the others (πυνθάνεσθαι) about what it’s like there and the 
souls from the sky asked what it’s like among them. And they told stories to 
one another (διηγεῖσθαι δὲ ἀλλήλαις), lamenting and crying as they called to 
mind what they experienced (τὰς μὲν ὀδυρομένας τε καὶ κλαούσας, 
ἀναμιμνῃσκομένας ὅσα τε καὶ οἷα πάθοιεν) and saw in their journey (πορείᾳ) 
under the earth. (614e-615a) 
 
The unusual collocation of the banal and matters of supreme philosophico-religious 
import may well remind us of the content and form of Plato’s dialogues. 
The souls in Er’s story are familiar to us not only in their human bodies, 
psychologies, and activities (talking, sleeping, etc.); they also remind us of characters 
familiar from earlier in the Republic. In Book I Cephalus describes the social 
gatherings of his elderly peers: 
So most of us get together and lament (ὀλοφύρονται), longing (ποθοῦντες) for 
the pleasures of youth and calling to mind (ἀναμιμνῃσκόμενοι) days of sex, 
                                                
8 See Inwood (2009: 31-35) for a full explication of the difficulties involved. 
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wine, festivity and other things like that, and we complain as though we’ve 
been deprived of the greatest things, saying that we lived well back then and 
now aren’t even living. And some also complain (ὀδύρονται) about their 
relatives’ reproaches against old age and in this vein they harp on old age, 
how many ills it causes them. But, Socrates, they don’t seem to me to blame 
the real cause (οὐ τὸ αἴτιον αἰτιᾶσθαι); for if this were responsible, I too would 
have suffered (ἐπεπόνθη) these same ills from old age, and all the others. 
(329a-b) 
 
Like the gathering of the souls in the myth, Cephalus and his friends lament their 
misfortunes (ὀδυρομένας τε καὶ κλαούσας, 615a; ὀλοφύρονται, ὀδύρονται, 329a-b), 
reminisce about the past (ἀναμιμνῃσκομένας, 615a; ἀναμιμνῃσκόμενοι, 329a), and 
misallocate blame (οὐ γὰρ ἑαυτὸν αἰτιᾶσθαι, 619c; οὐ τὸ αἴτιον αἰτιᾶσθαι, 329b). Just 
as the souls embrace one another upon meeting (ἀσπάζεσθαί, 614e), Cephalus 
embraces Socrates (ἠσπάζετό, 328c). Socrates converses with him (διαλεγόμενος, 
328d) just as the souls converse with one another (διηγεῖσθαι, 614e). Socrates then 
asks Cephalus (πυνθάνεσθαι, πυθοίμην, 328e) about the journey to old age, as if 
Cephalus had “traveled a journey which he too will perhaps have to travel” (328e).9 
So too, the souls ask one other (πυνθάνεσθαι, 614e) what each had experienced in 
its journey, one which the inquiring souls are about to make for themselves.10 The 
correspondences between the opening scene of the Republic and Er’s description of 
the underworld are striking. Lest we have missed the allusion to Cephalus, Socrates 
says that since it will take too long to tell Er’s story in full, he will tell only the 
κεφάλαιον, the summary (615a). Less than half a stephanus page later, Socrates 
reports: 
                                                
9 In Greek: ὥσπερ τινὰ ὁδὸν προεληλυθότων ἣν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἴσως δεήσει πορεύεσθαι. 
10 O’Connor (2006: 76-77) recognises the consistency of imagery between the two scenes, 
and notes that Hesiod’s metaphor of the “rough and steep” road of virtue and “short and 
steep” road of vice, cited by Adeimantus in Book II, is the crucial intertext for both (364d). It is 
important to keep in mind, I would argue, that the metaphor Plato adopts from Hesiod is an 
allegory of action in this world. The intertexts of the myth of Er consistently point us to an 
interpretation that concerns this life. 
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ἔφη γὰρ δὴ παραγενέσθαι ἐρωτωμένῳ ἑτέρῳ ὑπὸ ἑτέρου ὅπου εἴη Ἀρδιαῖος ὁ 
μέγας. (615c) 
 
For he said that he stood beside one man being asked by another where 
Ardiaeus the great was. 
 
The voices of Cephalus and Er seem to have blended for a moment, for directly 
following Cephalus’ description of the gatherings with his elderly friends, he says: 
[…] Σοφοκλεῖ ποτε τῷ ποιητῇ παρεγενόμην ἐρωτωμένῳ ὑπό τινος: ‘πῶς,’ ἔφη, 
‘ὦ Σοφόκλεις, ἔχεις πρὸς τἀφροδίσια;’ (329b-c) 
 
[…] Sophocles the poet, whom I once stood beside as he was being asked by 
another, “Where”, he said, “Sophocles, do you stand with regard to sex?” 
 
The Greek of the two passages is nearly identical.11 The close intertextuality between 
the two passages compels us to evaluate the myth in light of the earlier discussion in 
Polemarchus’ house. 
Why are we directed here in the myth of Er back to Cephalus’ speech in Book I? 
The souls in Er’s story are in fact no closer to truth about the afterlife than Cephalus 
had been. Like Cephalus and his companions, the souls are mired in ignorance of 
their imminent fate. Even once they have arrived at the τόπος δαιμόνιος, the 
distinction between underworld and upper-world remains, and knowledge of one 
remains exclusive of the other. The souls from the upper-world wonder, like 
Cephalus and readers of the Republic, what the nature of the underworld actually is 
(πυνθάνεσθαι τάς τε ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἡκούσας παρὰ τῶν ἑτέρων τὰ ἐκεῖ, 614e), and the 
answers they receive are based on recollection at best.12 So too, when the souls 
                                                
11 Er’s version is essentially Cephalus’, retold in oratio obliqua. Socrates’ retelling of Er’s 
story, then, is a report of a tradition handed down from a source that overheard the 
conversation of two others. We seem here to have the recipe for a Platonic dialogue within a 
Platonic dialogue – one, in fact, that highly resembles the dialogue recorded in Book I. Lars 
Albinus (1998: 100) alludes to this mise en abyme quality of the myth: “if the myth of Er, on a 
micro-level, parallels the myth of the whole of the Republic, on a macro-level, then the 
katabasis of Er may even correspond to the whole of the dialogue as a katabasis itself. In fact 
Socrates makes his own introduction onto the scene by saying: ‘I went down’ (kateben).” 
12 Ferrari (2009: 126) puts it well: “Despite its billing, the myth does not in fact describe the 
rewards and punishments received in the afterlife but instead describes describings of them.” 
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from the underworld ask what the nature of the upper-world is, the answer is an 
ineffable recollection of the past (615a).13 From our point of view, Er’s speech is 
frustratingly vague where we most desire precision; but it seems that the souls’ 
knowledge of their own destiny is no less vague. Indeed, the inner workings of the 
τόπος δαιμόνιος are no clearer to the souls in the afterlife than are the roles of 
chance, fate, and virtue to us in the intelligible world. On this reading, the souls in 
Er’s story are avatars of ourselves, ignorant, but still questioning. 
To return to our question: why are we directed back to Cephalus? My answer is 
twofold. First, our recollection of Cephalus’ speech places us – and the myth – 
squarely in the realm of the familiar; it suggests that the myth is interested in this 
world.14 Second, it compels us to reevaluate the myth with reference to Cephalus’ 
account of the afterlife. There, Cephalus recounts his experience of what Lear (2006: 
29) describes as “a traumatic cocktail.” Cephalus explains that as he approaches 
death’s door, he begins once again to fear the stories about the underworld that he 
had disregarded so easily as a younger man (330d-331b). His irrational fears gain 
such a hold on him that they dictate his actions. As a result, “Cephalus is unable to 
remain with Socrates and inquire into what justice really is: he has to go off to make 
a sacrifice (331d)” (Lear 2006: 29). Cephalus acts as a model of misreading myths 
like the myth of Er. We must keep in mind, despite what traditional legends have told 
                                                
13 To quote Ferrari (2009: 127): “The myth of Er […] makes the moment at which the purest 
souls get to contemplate the purest beauty literally invisible. It hides that scene behind holes 
in the sky; then grants it a mere two sentences of retrospective description which, unlike the 
descriptions offered by the souls that were sent to hell, give away practically nothing about 
the quality of the experience.” 
14 In this, my interpretation of the myth of Er is quite close to David Sedley’s (2009: 51-76) 
interpretation of the eschatological myth in the Gorgias. His comparison between the 
eschatological myth there with the myth of the leaky jar earlier in the dialogue is a particularly 
useful analogue for the Republic. He notes that in the Gorgias “Socrates has explicitly 
advertised the idea that myths of afterlife punishment serve as allegories for moral truths 
about this life” (Sedley 2009: 53). 
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us since youth, that we have no knowledge of what happens after death (τὰ γὰρ δὴ 
τοιαῦτα οὔτ᾽ ἐπιστάμεθα ἡμεῖς, 427b). 
The final point of resonance between the souls in the myth of Er and ourselves is 
also the most poignant. In the climax of the myth, a prophet delineates the terms of 
choice for the souls’ next life: each soul will get a lot that determines the order in 
which it makes its selection. There are more models of lives (βίων παραδείγµατα) 
than there are souls, and even the soul that has received the last lot can still find a 
happy life provided that it chooses wisely (619b). Afterwards, the souls make their 
selection in turn, a spectacle which Er describes as “pitiable, ridiculous, and 
incredible” (620a).15 Er reports: 
The one that had received the first lot went over straightaway and took 
(ἑλέσθαι) the biggest tyranny, and both because of his folly and greed he 
made his selection without scrutinizing it sufficiently (οὐ πάντα ἱκανῶς 
ἀνασκεψάμενον); he didn’t realize that it contained (αὐτὸν λαθεῖν ἐνοῦσαν) 
the destiny of eating his own children and other misfortunes. But when he 
examined it at his leisure (κατὰ σχολὴν σκέψασθαι), he beat his chest and 
lamented (κόπτεσθαί τε καὶ ὀδύρεσθαι) his choice, since he hadn’t abided by 
the warnings of the prophet. He did not blame himself for his misfortunes, but 
fate and spirits and everything except for himself. He was one of those that 
had come down from the sky, after he had lived in a well-ordered state during 
his previous life and obtained virtue by habit but without philosophy. (619b-d) 
 
This soul’s mistake is one of misreading, for the selection of lives is clearly presented 
as one of reading. The παραδείγματα are described in such a way that they must be 
texts. They are physical objects that can be grasped by the hands (ἑλέσθαι) 
containing (ἐνοῦσαν) discernible bits of information – information that may escape a 
superficial reading (αὐτὸν λαθεῖν). For this reason, they also demand careful scrutiny 
                                                
15 This description should, perhaps, prepare us for a narrative resembling dramatic literature. 
The only other appearance of ἐλεεινός in the Republic occurs earlier in Book X, describing the 
emotions induced by tragedy. Socrates uses γέλοιος in the same passage to describe comic 
performances (ἐν μιμήσει δὲ κωμῳδικῇ, 606c), and Aristotle refers to τὸ θαυμαστὸν as an 
essential feature of tragedy (Poet. 1452a). 
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(ἀνασκεψάμενον, σκέψασθαι), which requires leisure (κατὰ σχολήν).16 These texts 
contain within them descriptions of events typical of tragedies (παίδων αὑτοῦ 
βρώσεις καὶ ἄλλα κακά, 619b), and the souls react to the contents of these texts in 
much the same way that Socrates describes the reactions of audiences to tragedies 
and comedies, abandoning themselves to lamentation and to identification with the 
texts before them (605d).17 
For the other souls the choice of the παραδείγματα is a matter of reflection 
(μεμνημένην) and observation (κατιδοῦσαν), but especially for Odysseus. Er reports 
his selection as follows: 
And [he said that] by chance the soul of Odysseus, having obtained the last 
lot of all, went about to make his selection, and because of his recollection of 
his previous toils (πόνων), he ceased from ambition (φιλοτιμίας) and went 
around for a long time seeking the life of a regular man, one who refrains 
from political affairs (ζητεῖν περιιοῦσαν χρόνον πολὺν βίον ἀνδρὸς ἰδιώτου 
ἀπράγμονος). Though with some difficulty, he found it lying neglected by the 
others, and upon seeing it he said that he would have done the same thing 
even if he had gotten the first lot, and so he took it up happily. (620c-d) 
 
Odysseus’ choice is successful due to careful scrutiny of the παραδείγματα – one 
that is not satisfied by a superficial reading, but rather probes the texts for their 
deeper significance for him. Odysseus’ soul is marked not only as a successful 
reader, but as a particular kind of reader. Er reports that he went around seeking 
(ζητεῖν περιιοῦσαν) the life of an ἀπράγμων ἰδιώτης. This peripatetic inquiry should 
remind us of Socrates. In Book I Thrasymachus offered a portrait of Socrates: “here 
you have the wisdom of Socrates: he himself is unwilling to teach, but he goes 
around (περιιόντα) learning from others” (338b). When Socrates describes his 
                                                
16 In Plato’s dialogues, σχολή is often implicated with the processes of reading and writing. 
The phrase κατὰ σχολήν in particular is strongly associated with literary activity in Plato. It 
suggests scholarly activity in all of its nine other uses in the Platonic corpus, and in four of the 
nine it is linked explicitly with physical texts (Leg. 858b, Phdr. 228a, Tht. 143a, Ti., 24a). 
17 See also Phileb. 48a. 
B. Beck 10 
divinely-sanctioned mission in the Apology, he says, “even now I go around seeking 
and investigating (περιιὼν ζητῶ, 23b) to see if I think anyone is wise.” Throughout the 
Platonic corpus Socrates consistently poses himself as an ἀπράγμων ἰδιώτης, as any 
reader of the dialogues can attest.18 Earlier in the Republic Socrates describes 
himself – and the model philosopher living in a corrupt state – as one who “keeps 
quiet and minds his own business” (ἡσυχίαν ἔχων καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττων), a virtual 
definition of ἀπραγμοσύνη (496d). Odysseus’ search is marked as characteristically 
Socratic.19 Better yet, Odysseus’ investigation into the βίος of a non-professional and 
apolitical ἰδιώτης may remind us of ourselves. As readers of Sokratikoi Logoi, we, like 
Odysseus, seek and scrutinize a quasi-biographical portrait – a βίος – of Socrates, 
the ἀνήρ ἰδιώτης par excellence.20 
Er’s report of the spectacle of souls choosing the παραδείγματα of their next lives 
should remind us of ourselves. It is presented as a scene of reading, and the stakes 
of misreading are high. Our own reading of the Republic, a conversation that 
Socrates calls a παραδείγμα, is of the highest of stakes (472e). It is, as Socrates tells 
Thrasymachus, “the search for justice, a thing more valuable than a vast store of 
gold” (336e). The Republic is also at its core about choosing the right model of life. In 
reading the dialogue’s search for the value of living with justice, we are prompted 
time and again to consider how the Republic relates to us. Plato’s aim is protreptic; 
                                                
18 See, for example, Phaedr. 227e-228a; Phaedr. 236d; Euthyd. 295e. 
19 A suggestion already proposed by Planinc (2003: 18) and O’Connor (2006: 60), who writes: 
“It is Socrates himself who seems to be projected onto the chastened Odysseus, who retires 
to private life from the hurly-burly of his ‘labors.’ […] Socrates explicitly uses himself as an 
example of this private, retiring philosopher (496c).” 
20 It may not be unreasonable to suggest that Plato himself may have understood his own 
work a part of an (albeit nascent) tradition of biography. Indeed, biography was beginning to 
come into its own as a genre in the fourth century B.C. Arnaldo Momigliano (1993: 32) finds 
evidence of biographical and autobiographical works in the fifth century. He recognises 
Plato’s place in the biographical tradition, noting that “both Plato and Xenophon apparently 
created new types of biographical and autobiographical narration” (47). 
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he wants to change the way we live by reminding us of the impact of our choices on 
our own lives. Stephen Halliwell elaborates: 
If we focus on a this-worldly reading of the myth, the motif of a prenatal life 
choice can be interpreted as a stark emblem of the inescapably self-forming 
consequences of ethical agency, a magnified image of how at every 
moment…the individual soul/person is intrinsically responsible for what 
matters most about its existence. Every action, we might thus say, brings with 
it its own “afterlife.” (Halliwell 2007: 469) 
 
Odysseus within the myth and Socrates as external exegete both interpret the texts 
before them for their personal significance to themselves. Socrates’ exegesis of Er’s 
other-worldly story focuses on the here-and-now. In the middle of his report of Er’s 
description Socrates says: 
Here, as it seems, dear Glaucon, is the whole danger for a man. And 
therefore each of us must take the greatest care – to the disregard of all other 
lessons – to be an inquirer and student of this lesson: to see if from anywhere 
he is able to learn of and find someone who will make him capable and 
knowledgeable, able to distinguish a good life from bad…so that he can 
choose once he has reasoned it out well, looking to the nature of the soul, 
calling the life worse that makes his soul less just and calling the life better 
that makes his soul more just. He will disregard all other considerations; for 
we have discovered that this is the best choice both in life and in death (ζῶντί 
τε καὶ τελευτήσαντι). (618b-618e) 
 
Socrates focuses his reading of the myth on the fledgling student of philosophy, the 
ideal reader of the Republic, and he seems to interpret the prenatal life choice as an 
allegorical representation of our own choices in this life. Where we expect to see a 
portrait of another world characterizing the ineffable blessedness of just souls in the 
afterlife, we get instead a depiction of embodied souls trying to discover through 
dialogue the nature of divine retribution in the afterlife, souls whose fate depends on 
their understanding of the text that lies before them.21 Instead of another world, we 
find an image of ourselves, refracted through a mythic lens. 
                                                
21 See Inwood (2009: 45), where he emphasises the this-worldly implications of the myth of 
Er: “the underworld choice seems to have pre-empted what we normally regard as our choice 
within life.” He suggests, along the lines of Halliwell’s interpretation, that “the lottery-choice 
combination in the underworld represents the mixture of chance and choice that forms a life,” 
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Shortly after the allegory of the cave in Republic VII, Socrates tells Glaucon that 
they should search for the study that will “naturally conduce to the awakening of 
thought,” a study that “really does tend to draw the mind to essence and reality” 
(523a).22 When Glaucon fails to understand his meaning, Socrates explains that 
intellectually provocative experiences (παρακαλοῦντα) are those that “make one 
thing clear no more than its opposite” (523c). Provocative experiences, then, are 
those that compel us to choose between two mutually exclusive meanings. Glaucon 
responds that “these communications to the soul are strange (ἄτοποι) and require 
further inquiry.” Socrates continues: “It is in such cases that the soul first summons to 
its aid calculating reason and thought (λογισµός and νόησις) and tries to investigate 
whether each of the things reported to it is one or two” (524b). The myth of Er 
performs this function precisely. The contradictory nature of the myth is carefully 
calculated so as to lead us to the kinds of critiques so often sounded about the end 
of the Republic. In recasting traditional eschatological myths into a new, but no less 
problematic, form, Plato compels his readers to critique in his myth the very 
inconsistencies they allow to pass without criticism in the myths they have been told 
since youth. For Plato it is these provocative contradictions that most lead us up 
toward the light of critical thought. 
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but is wary of concluding that the myth is “an allegory concerning the nature of our present 
life.” 
22 Trans. Paul Shorey. 
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